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JSC Safety and Mission Assurance  
Space Shuttle Program Legacy Report 
 A legacy is something from the past that is passed on to a beneficiary.  It 
is the hope of the S&MA community that the graphics in this report will 
provide instant visibility for lessons learned, which can be quickly 
assimilated and applied to future human spaceflight programs. 
https://ntrs.nasa.gov/search.jsp?R=20120002677 2019-08-30T19:20:19+00:00Z
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 Share lessons learned on Space Shuttle Safety and Mission Assurance (S&MA) 
culture, processes, and products that can guide future enterprises to improve 
mission success and minimize the risk of catastrophic failures. 
 
 Present the chronology of the Johnson Space Center (JSC) S&MA organization 
over the 40-year history of the Space Shuttle Program (SSP) and identify key 
factors and environments which contributed to positive and negative 
performance: 
 
 Staffing skills/qualifications       
 Budget 
 Paradigms 
 Requirements 
 Program interfaces and expectations 
 Communications  
 Proactive/reactive processes 
 Lessons learned 
 
PURPOSE 
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 Capture the findings of the formally-chartered boards that reviewed the Space 
Shuttle Program following the Challenger and Columbia incidents.   
 
 Interview S&MA and program workers and managers from the past and present. 
 
  Focus on culture, processes, and products. 
 Evaluate the S&MA culture, processes and products that existed at times of 
successes and failures. 
 Review the evolution of S&MA processes and products. 
 Identify actions that ultimately transformed the JSC S&MA organization into 
an effective contributor to the shuttle program team.  
 
  Use graphics to provide instant visibility of lessons learned and significant 
incidents during the Space Shuttle Program, so lessons learned can be quickly 
assimilated and applied to future human spaceflight programs. 
APPROACH 
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 Culture 
 History of significant S&MA funding fluctuations, driven by accidents and 
periods of mission success. 
 An organizational shift to a program support structure (SSP, ISS, CxP, etc.) 
versus a discipline structure (Safety, Reliability, Quality Assurance) improved 
S&MA relationships with the program offices and increased overall S&MA 
effectiveness. 
 Established Program S&MA office – Integrated S&MA across centers 
  Processes 
 Risk analysis processes evolved over time and were eventually utilized in SSP 
decision-making forums. 
 The establishment of the S&MA Technical Authority (STA) in 2004 resulted in a 
more focused role for the safety community in SSP risk decisions. 
  Products 
 Maturing of probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) and other analysis techniques 
improved the quality of risk assessments and overall effectiveness of S&MA. 
 Risk assessment and risk trade skills improved over time and were better 
utilized near the end of the program. 
 
KEY FACTORS 
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 An effective S&MA organization identifies and recommends risk-based solutions 
to problems and is not merely a compliance organization (“yes if” vs. “no 
because). 
 
 In order to be relevant, a safety organization must produce and deliver high 
quality risk analysis products (both quantitative and qualitative) to be utilized by 
both S&MA and program management in the decision making process. 
 
 The establishment of the S&MA Technical Authority was effective in addressing 
a number of deficiencies within the S&MA community. 
 Improved the appeal path for dissenting opinions. 
 Led to a more technically competent S&MA organization due to improved 
relationships and interface with the engineering community. 
 Addressed limited S&MA career path by providing high-profile technical 
leadership positions within the S&MA organization. 
 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
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 The integration of program S&MA functions across all participating centers has 
increased organizational effectiveness. 
 Better coordination and sharing of technical data resulted in improved 
timeliness and quality of S&MA risk assessments. 
 Early coordination and resolution of technical issues resulted in better 
S&MA support to the SSP and Office of Safety & Mission Assurance. 
 
 A process is needed to periodically assess the health of the S&MA organization, 
taking into consideration: 
 Budget trends/staffing levels 
 Personnel turnover 
 Anomaly trends/close calls 
 Use of dissenting opinion process 
 Review of S&MA products 
 
 
CONCLUSIONS (cont.) 
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S&MA Space Shuttle Program Legacy Graphic 
 
 Depicts the chronology of the S&MA function from the early SR&QA organization 
to the current S&MA configuration.  
 Graphic is centered around a notional depiction of S&MA effectiveness over time. 
 Annotations have been added to the timeline to explain variations and provide 
summaries of formal investigation committee reports. 
 Information sources include interviews with current and past shuttle and S&MA 
employees, formal reports, and organizational/budget records.   
  
Space Shuttle Program Significant Incidents Graphic  
  
This graphic is extracted from the Significant Incidents and Close Calls in Human 
Spaceflight graphic to reflect only the Space Shuttle Program incidents.  It is 
presented to characterize and better define the situational environment during the 
shuttle era from a risk awareness perspective.   
GRAPHICS 
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STS-107                                  2/1/2003
TPS damage from ascent debris strike resulted 
in loss of crew and vehicle on entry.
Crew: 7                               Loss of Crew
EVA Inadvert ent  Releases:
Mission ID / EVA / #  lost / year 
STS-134/ULF6 / 2 / 4 / 2011
STS-133/ULF5 / 1 / 1 / 2011
STS-126/ULF2 / 1 / 24 / 2008
STS-124/1J / 2 / 1 / 2008
STS-120/10A / 4 / 2 / 2007
STS-116/12A.1 / 3 / 1 / 2006
STS-116/12A.1 / 1 / 1 / 2006
STS-115/12A / 2 / 1 / 2006
STS-115/12A / 1 / 1 / 2006
STS-121/ULF1.1 / 3 / 1 / 2006
STS-102/5A.1 / 1 / 2 / 2001    
STS-104/7A / 3 / 1 / 2001    
STS-100/6A / 2 / 1 / 2001
STS-92/3A / 3 / 1 / 2000       
STS-101/2A.2a / 1 / 1 / 2000     
STS-103/HST / 3 / 1 / 1999
STS-96/2A.1 / 1 / 1 / 1999  
STS-88/2A / 2 / 3 / 1998
STS-88/2A / 1 / 4 / 1998      
STS-51-I / 1 / 1 / 1985 
STS-51-A / 2 / 2 / 1984
STS-41-G / 1 / 1 / 1984
STS-41-C / 2 / 1 / 1984
TPS Ent ry Event s (1981-2003):
Fire/Overheat ing Event s:
STS-40, 6/1991, Crew: 7 *
STS-35, 12/1990, Crew: 7 *
STS-28, 8/1989, Crew: 5 *
STS-6, 4/1983, Crew: 4 *
*  toxic byproducts released
STS-51F                              7/29/1985
Temperature sensor problems resulted in 
Main Engine (ME-1) shutdown at T+ 5:45. 
Crew: 7                         Abort To Orbit
STS-41D              6/26/1984
LH2 fire after launch scrub. Evacuation by 
slidewire baskets considered but not used due 
to lack of confidence in a system that had not 
been tested with human subjects.
Crew: 6
STS-1              4/12/1981
SRB ignit ion pressure wave caused TPS and 
structural damage.
Crew: 2
STS-107                                  2/1/2003
TPS damage from ascent debris strike resulted 
in loss of crew and vehicle on entry.
Crew: 7                               Loss of Crew
STS-9                             12/8/1983
Two GPCs failed during 
reconfiguration for entry.  One GPC 
could not be recovered.
Crew: 6
STS-91                           6/2/1998
PASS corrupted by GPS error.
Crew: 6
STS-51D                                     4/19/1985
TPS burn-through on left outboard elevon.
Crew: 7
Other significant STS TPS anomalies: 
STS-6, 41B, 51G, 27* , 28, 40, 42, 45
*  Most severe t ile damage to date.
ISS, Fl ight  2A.1                5/1999
Crew sickened in FGB; likely a result 
of high localized CO2  levels due to 
poor ventilat ion.
Crew: 7
STS-99                               2/2000
High bacterial count in postflight 
sample after GIRA installed to 
removed iodine.
Crew: 6
SRB Seal Event s (1981-1996):
Other SRB gas sealing anomalies:  STS-2, 
6, 11, 41D, 51C, 51D, 51B, 51G, 51F, 51I, 
51J, 61A, 61B, 61C, 42, 71, 70, 78
STS-51L                      1/28/1986
SRB seal failure.
Crew: 7                    Loss of Crew
Mission              Date of Mission or Incident/Close Call (month/day/year or month/year)
            
           Summary
            Red border with yellow shading – Loss of crew
            Orange shading – Crew injury and/or loss of vehicle/mission
            Blue Shading – Recurring event
            Black text – No injury or loss of crew or vehicle                    
   Crew Size                                     Significant Result
STS-2                          11/12/1981
Fuel cell failure resulted in high 
levels of hydrogen in drinking water.  
Crew: 2             Mission Terminated
STS-3                     3/30/1982
Pilot induced oscillat ion during 
derotation. Stronger than predicted 
winds contributed.
Crew: 2
STS-83                            4/6/1997
Failure of fuel cell number 2 
resulted in minimum duration flight 
being declared. The 15-day mission 
was shortened to 3 days. 
                 Minimum Duration Flight
Crew: 7                     Loss of Mission
STS-95         10/29/1998
Drag chute door separated during launch 
and impacted main engine bell.
Crew: 7
STS-98                  2/10/2001
EVA crew member sprayed with 
ammonia requiring 
decontamination procedures. 
Crew: 5 (2 EVA)             
Earth Orbit
As
ce
nt
Entry
STS-90                       5/3/1998
Hard, fast landing due to human factors 
and rogue wind gust.  Hardest STS 
landing to date.
Crew: 7
STS-37                     4/11/1991
Several factors contributed to a low-
energy landing 623 feet prior to the 
threshold of the runway at the backup 
landing location.
Crew: 5      Low Energy Landing
Landing and Postlanding
Descent
STS-112                                 10/7/2002
T-0 umbilical issues resulted in none of the 8 
SRB Hold Down Post “ A”  pyrotechnic charges 
firing.
Crew: 6
STS-51D                     4/19/1985
Right brake failed (locked-up) causing 
blowout of inboard t ire and significant 
damage to outboard t ire.
Crew: 7
STS-91             6/2/1998
Main engine pressure chamber sensor failed. 
If it  occurred later, logic error may have 
triggered an RTLS.
Crew: 6↑/7↓
STS-114                               7/26/2005
A) Bird-strike on External Tank.
B) Loss of foam from External Tank PAL 
ramp.
C) TPS gap fillers protruding.  Removed 
during third mission EVA.  
Crew: 7
STS-93                        7/23/1999
A) At T+ 5 a short on AC1 Phase A 
resulted in loss of SSME 1 Controller A 
and SSME 3 Controller B.
B) ME-3 H2 leak: early LOX depletion and 
shutdown.
Crew: 5
STS-95                      10/29/1998
Preflight sterilization process 
chemically altered the Low Iodine 
Residual System result ing in 
contaminated drinking water.
Crew: 7
STS-1                                4/14/1981
Right-hand main landing gear door warped 
due to entry heating.
Crew: 2
STS-87                      11/21/1997
Spartan satellite deployed without 
proper activation. Recapture with 
RMS failed. Later captured by EVA 
crew.
Crew: 6              
STS-104                              7/2001
EMU battery leaked hazardous KOH.  
Discovered during EMU checkout.
Crew: 5
STS-108                          12/17/2001
Violation of minimum landing weather 
requirements.
Crew: 7STS-51                            9/12/1993
Both port-side primary & secondary 
SUPER*ZIP explosive cords fired, 
result ing in containment tube failure 
and damage in the payload bay.
Crew: 5
STS-32                      1/9/1990
Erroneous state vector up-linked to 
flight control system, causing 
immediate and unpredictable att itude 
control problems.
Crew: 5        Loss of Att itude Control
STS-63                              2/9/1995
EVA thermal system failed to protect 
hands of crew from extreme cold.
Crew: 2 EVA             EVA Terminated
STS-80                  11/28/1996
Lose screw jammed airlock hatch 
preventing operation. 
Crew: 5 (2 EVA)       EVA Terminated
STS-44                          11/24/1991
Failure of IMU 2 caused minimum 
duration flight to be declared. 10-
day mission shortened to 7 days.
Crew: 6      Minimum Duration Flight
Challenger Colum b ia
STS-133                     2/26/2011
Experienced significant misalignment 
between orbiter and ISS during post-
capture free drift  due to gravity-
gradient-induced motion.
Crew: 6
STS-130                     2/10/2010
Experienced significant misalignment 
between orbiter and ISS during post-
capture free drift  due to gravity-
gradient-induced motion.
Crew: 6
STS-134                             6/1/2011
Brief fire observed between the left 
main landing gear t ires during runway 
rollout.
Crew: 7
STS-134             5/6/2011
Small cylindrical object liberated from 
vehicle during ascent.
Crew: 6
N2H4 Sp i l l  af t er  APU Hot f ire                           11/1979
Leak of approximately 2 gallons of N2H4 after hotfire in 
OPF1 due to incompatible material in gage saver fit t ings 
on servicing cart.  
STS-2 OM S Pod  M M H Fire                            Fal l  1981
MMH spilled onto MLI blanket containing gold foil.  Gold 
foil catalyzed the MMH, result ing in fire.
Post -STS-6 FRCS M M H Sp il l                         4/18/1983
Liquid MMH spilled onto technician when thruster ferry 
plug was removed.  Low temperatures during ferry flight 
resulted in leaking valves.
                                    Injury (1)
OPF2 Fire Deluge Soaks Orb it er                  9/24/1989
While replacing a leaking valve, technicians inadvertently 
activated the OPF2 fire deluge system due to isolation 
valve handles not complying with industry convention. 
STS-51D Fire                  4/12/1984
Tire damage from spin-up wear and 
locked brake sufficient to pose 
explosion risk to ground crew.
STS-9 APU Fire               12/8/1983
APU hydrazine leak resulted in a fire in the 
aft compartment of the vehicle during 
landing and subsequent runway 
operations. The fire caused damage to 
and early shutdown of APUs 1 and 2.
Crew: 6
STS-1 Anoxia                           3/19/1981
Workers entered orbiter aft compartment 
unaware it  was filled with nitrogen.
                         Loss of Life (3)
    Injury (2)
STS-2 N2O4 Sp il l                         9/22/1981
Ground half coupling failed due to iron 
nitrate buildup, result ing in release of 15-20 
gallons of N2O4 onto vehicle, which 
damaged adhesive bond on 370 t iles.
Integration, Assembly, and Processing
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